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1. Introduction 
 
Although there has been a great deal of empirical research on wage 
inequality, there has been relatively little empirical work on compensation 
inequality. Compensation is a more relevant concept than wages if one is 
concerned about measuring incentives to work or incentives to hire, or if 
one is interested in broader aspects of well-being.  
In the U.S., fringe benefits represent a substantial portion of 
compensation because they include things like health insurance and 
pension benefits. Bloom and Freeman (1992) examined the contribution of 
fringe benefits to the growth in overall earnings inequality in U.S. Their 
results indicated that focus solely on wage earnings understated inequality 
in the economy. Lazear and Rosen (1987) compared the distribution of 
individuals’ wages to the distribution of their wage plus pension benefits by 
estimating “typical” workers’ pension benefits. They found that pension 
benefits increased earnings inequality. Benedict and Shaw (1995) used 
individual-level pension information in their study of how occupational 
pension benefits affected the distribution of earned income in the U.S. 
Annual pension accrual values for each individual were obtained by 
calculating the expected present values of pension liabilities in year t and t-
1 and differencing them to get the annual accrual. Pensions increased 
annual earnings inequality by about three percent among all employed, and 
by 21 per cent among unionised workers. They also found that public 
pensions strongly reduced inequality in the distribution of expected lifetime 
earnings. 
The intent of this paper for Sweden is to compare the distribution of 
individuals’ wage income to the distribution of labor compensation when 
important non-wage benefits are included. It is often thought that non-wage 
benefits are relatively unimportant in Sweden (and in several European 
countries) because the government provides pensions and sickness benefits. 
However, this is a misstatement. It is true that the government provides 
pension plans and sickness benefit insurance but these are tied to 
employment and are important components of worker compensation. All 
employees are covered by earnings-related social insurance. In addition, 
practically all employees are covered by quasi-mandatory collective-
agreement insurance schemes financed by payroll contributions, which are 
non-actuarial on the individual level. There are four main schemes that 
build on collective bargaining agreements: one for private sector white-
collar workers, one for private sector blue-collar workers, one for state 
employees, and one for local authority and county council employees. They 
cover the same areas as the social insurance scheme. They raise the level of   3
compensation especially upon illness and retirement. A second scheme is in 
particular important to high-wage earners because most of the plans replace 
earnings above the ceiling in the social insurance scheme. 
In this study, focus is on pensions, survivors’ benefits and sickness 
benefits. They compensate for income losses due to retirement, death of a 
spouse and illness. 
There are several reasons why one might expect insurance compensation 
inequality to differ from wage inequality in a systematic way. The 
collective-agreement benefit design differs between sectors and in 
particular, favours full career, well-paid white-collar workers. One aspect 
of non-wage benefits is their potential as a tool for counteracting the effect 
of the solidarity wage policy. The wage dispersion in Sweden is among the 
lowest in the world (Katz and Autor, 1999), partly due to the solidarity 
wage policy. In this case, the implication is that the earnings differentials 
may increase because of non-wage benefits.  
The probability of the insurance situation occurring varies between 
sexes, marital status, ages etc. The sickness rate is higher for women than 
for men, higher for blue-collar workers than for white-collar workers and 
increases with age. The mandatory widow’s or widower’s pension is of no 
value for unmarried men and women. Thus, we could expect the non-wage 
benefit of the sickness benefit insurance to be higher for women than for 
men cet.par. and of the survivors’ pension to be higher for married than for 
singles cet.par. On one hand the  pension design with unisex life tables 
favours female employees because the life expectancy of women is higher 
than that of men, on the other it favours employees with uneven and steep 
(covered) age-earnings profiles. If the distribution of insurance cover is 
skewed toward high-income earners, insurance benefits will raise earnings 
inequality even if there are wage compensation differentials. 
In the year of our study for Sweden, 1995, social and negotiated 
collective-agreement insurance schemes are defined benefit (DB) plans. 
The individual non-wage benefits of the insurance coverage are non-
observed. In the paper, a method of investigating these values indirectly is 
proposed and used for examining the contribution of benefits to the overall 
earnings inequality. We estimate each non-wage benefit under the 
assumption that it equals the premium required for the same benefit 
payment in a private individual insurance scheme. The annual accrual in 
the expected present value of a person’s pension liabilities from 
employment is calculated to estimate his or her pension income acquired 
during the year. The probability of surviving is diversified according to sex. 
We determine the survivors’ benefit income by calculating its actuarial 
value, taking into account differences in occupational sector design, annual   4
earnings, age, sex, life expectancy, age of the spouse/cohabite, his or her 
life expectancy, number of children and the children’s ages. The 
employee’s sickness benefit income is estimated by calculating the 
actuarial value of sickness benefits when the risk of sickness is diversified 
according to sex, age, socio-economic group and occupational sector. 
Our estimations are based on a representative sample of the Swedish 
adult population 20-60 years old. More precisely we employ a part of the 
household income survey for 1995 (Statistics Sweden). This survey is 
based on about 10 000 households in all. Individuals are interviewed 
concerning labor market status, household structure and housing 
conditions. The interviews are supplemented by register data on income 
from different sources and with other variables. The non-response rate for 
1995 was below 20 percent. Differential non-response is accounted for by 
adjusted sampling weights.  
Using data on annual before-tax wages and estimating the before-tax 
benefits of the earnings-related security package of social and collective-
agreement insurance, we investigate the inequality implications of the 
broader measures. How much of inequality in total wages can thus be 
attributed to money wage and how much to insurance cover, regarding old 
age pension, survivors’ pension and sickness benefit income? Are there 
differences between men and women in the way these non-wage benefits 
affect inequality? Does the inequality structure of the benefits vary across 
occupational groups? How are different wage groups affected?  
We examine some inequality measures such as the coefficient of 
variation and Lorenz curves. Decomposing is used to enhance under-
standing.   
The paper is organised as follows: Section 1 gives the introduction. 
Section 2 presents the method of investigating the non-observed benefits. 
The sample is presented in section 3. Inequality measures and 
decomposition methods are described in section 4 and the results are given 
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2. Estimating non-wage benefits 
 
 
Pension benefit income 
 
The annual accrual in the expected present value of pension liabilities from 
employment during the year t is used to estimate the pension income (P) 
acquired during the year, 
       
      ( 1 )  
where 
 
Lt = annual pension payments earned up to year t, 
D = age at death, 
N = age at retirement, 
A = current age,  
SA,N = the probability of surviving from age A to age N. SA,N is diversified 
according to sex, 
r = 0.02 the chosen real rate of discount. 
 
Survivors’ benefit income 
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 where 
pi = the probability of the insurance situation occurring, that is, the 
mortality risk. This is calculated by age and sex
1,  
Occ
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1 We do not account for differences in death risks between socio-economic groups, but 
studies suggest that they are to the disadvantage of blue-collar workers, and would 
decrease their old age pension income and increase their survivors’ pension income if 
they were included (Vågerö and Lundberg, 1995). 
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wages, marginal tax rate, age of spouse/cohabite, mean life expectancy, 
number of children, children’s ages, rate of discount) according to the 
survivors’ benefit design,  
=
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i B  the discounted value of the payments from the social insurance, 






i B B = (married/cohabite, pension points in the social insurance 
old age pension scheme, number of years with pension points, marginal tax 
rate, number of children, children’s ages, rate of discount) according to the 
survivors’ benefit design,  
=
Occ
j A  administrative costs of the collective-agreement insurance scheme 
j, A
Soc  of the social insurance scheme,  0 = =
Soc Occ
j A A , 
r = 0.02 the chosen real rate of discount. 
 
Sickness benefit income 
 
The complexity of the sickness benefit design requires data on the expected 
number of days at the different replacement levels for the first day, days 2-
14, days 15-90 and days 91-365. Data on sick-periods are lacking however 
in our 1995 database and sickness compensation is known only as the 
year’s total for the days after days 1-14 for the sick-periods.  We therefore 
follow the simpler path of Selén and Ståhlberg (2002) where the strategy 
was to non-parametrically estimate sickness behaviour for different groups, 
and calculate the benefits under certain assumptions utilising data from 
1990 when all sickness compensation was administered by the National 
social administration and therefore centrally registered. Estimates from 
Selén and Ståhlberg (2002) concerning sickness benefits by socio-
economic group, sector, sex and age group cross-classified (cf. table 4.2 
ibid.) are imputed to the individuals in the data-base employed here. 
 
 
3. Sample presentation and introductory 
results 
 
The means of the wage variables are shown in Table 1. The major part of 
the benefits is pensions. The gender differences in the mean values of 
benefits are larger in the collective-agreement schemes than in the social 
insurance scheme. However, the female to male mean wage ratio does not  
   7
Table 1: Means of wage variables in 100 SEK and non-wage 
benefit shares. Employees aged 20 to 60. Standard deviations 
in parentheses, weighted data. 
 
 
  All Female Male
  












   
A) Non-wage benefits from the 
social insurance scheme: 
 
1 Pension benefits    230
( 214)




2 Sickness benefits       93
(   45)
  100 
(   41) 
    86
(   48)
3 Survivors’ benefits         8
(     9)
      6 
(     5) 
     10
(    11)
Non-wage benefits, total (Σ 1,2,3)     340
( 228)
   358 
( 247) 
   322
(  207)
  




1 Pension benefits      168
 (1019)
     79 
( 705) 
   255
(1248)
2 Sickness benefits          6
 (     4)
       6 
(     2) 
       6
(      4)
3 Survivors’ benefits         17
 (    22)
     14 
(   16) 
     20
(    27)
Non-wage benefits, total (Σ 1,2,3)       190 
 (1024)
     99 
(  706) 
    281
(1254)
  
Non-wage benefits from the social 
insurance and collective-agreement 
schemes (A+B): 
 
1 Pension benefits      407
 (1060)
   331 
 ( 769) 
     481
 ( 1280)
2 Sickness benefits         99 
 (    48)
   106  
  (  43) 
       92 
 (    52)
3 Survivors’ benefits         25
 (    30)
     20  
  (  20) 
       30
  (   36)
Non-wage benefits, total (Σ 1,2,3)        541
 ( 1079)
    457 
 ( 784) 
     603
  (1301)
     8
Non-wage benefit shares, %:   
Total benefits/total wage     17.8   19.0    16.4
Total  benefits/money wage     23.9   25.9    22.0
Social insurance benefits/money 
wage 
   17.9   21.5    14.4
Collective-agreement insurance 
benefits/money wage 
     6.0     4.4      7.5
  
Pension benefits/money wage     17.0    17.6    16.3
Sickness benefits/money wage      5.6      6.9      4.4
Survivors’ benefits/money wage      1.3      1.3      1.3
  
# of observations  10 954  5 529  5 425
 
 
change due to an inclusion of all non-wage insurance benefits. For both 
money wage and total wage the ratio is about 72 percent. 
To get an idea of the magnitudes of the benefit/total-wage ratio and   
benefit/money-wage ratio in the sample, the shares are shown in the lower 
part of Table 1. The mean benefit/total-wage ratio is about 18 percent
2 and 
the mean benefit/money-wage ratio is about 24 percent with 18 percent 
from the social insurance scheme and 6 percent from the collective-
agreement schemes. 
The benefit shares are somewhat higher for women than for men. For 
example, the ratio of average sickness benefits to the money wage is larger 
for women than for men because the risk of sickness and thus the actuarial 
value of the insurance provision is higher for women. The average pension 
benefits relative to the money wage is somewhat higher for women than for 
men since life expectancy of women is higher than that of men, while the 
average survivors’ benefits relative to the money wage are the same for 
men and women. To notice is that women get a relatively larger part of the 
benefits from the social insurance scheme (22 percent) than from the 
collective-agreement scheme (4 percent). For men the corresponding shares 
are more even, i.e. 14 percent and 8 percent. 
Negative benefits are possible; this occurs for the pension benefits when 
Lt-Lt-1 in (1) is negative. Negative benefits may result in a negative total 
income. This is a rare event for our data and occurs for 29 of the 10 954 
individuals, but requires some consideration in an inequality analysis.     
                                                 
2 The share of benefits to total wage is 22 percent, i.e. 54 100/246 100.   9
4. Inequality comparison and decomposition 
methods 
 
Comparisons of inequality for the different income measures will be based 
on Lorenz curves and inequality indices. We will favour Lorenz consistent 
inequality measures (see Foster and Ok, 1999). The practical consequence 
is that the variance of logarithms is excluded and even impossible to use 
since the pension benefits need not be positive for all individuals.   
A measure of inequality used here is the square of the coefficient of 
variation that is the square of the standard deviation divided by the mean. 
The relationship of the squared coefficient of variation for total wage CVT
2 
to the corresponding coefficients CVM
2 and CVB
2 for the components 
money wage and benefits, which add up to total wage, is 
 
  CVT
2  = (1 - α)
2  CVM
2  +   α
2  CVB
2  + 2 ρ α  (1 - α) CVM CVB ,  (3) 
  
where α is the share of total wage from benefits and ρ the correlation 
between benefits and money wage.  
The interpretation of a larger and more positive correlation ρ is a higher 
incidence of benefits among those with high money wage or a lack of 
compensating differentials. An increased variation for the benefits will 
increase total variation according to (3), but if the benefits only are a small 
share of total wage and thus α is small, then the effects of benefits are 
generally small.  
The extension of (3) to more than two components is easily realised: a 
sum of CV
2: s weighted by their respective shares squared and a sum of all 
pairs of CV products weighted by the product of two times their shares and 
their correlation, respectively.   
The decomposition (3) is simple at least for two components but lacks 
desirable properties. It is not additive in the CV
2-components since 
products of linear CV:s are included. There are general problems 
establishing unique additive decompositions rules for inequality measures, 
as is obvious from the following discussion, and the choice of method is 
controversial. The lack of uniqueness for additive decompositions 
I(Y)=ΣkSk is shown by Shorrocks (1982,1983). Here I(Y) is an inequality 
measure for the income distribution Y=(Y1,..,YN) for N individuals, and Sk 
depends on income from source k. Decomposition rules are easily derived 
for inequality measures of the type  
 
 I(Y)=Σi ai(Y)Yi,     (4)   10
 
specified as weighted sums of total income Yi with weights  ai(Y), i=1,. .,N. 
Total income Yi adds  income sources Yik,  Yi=ΣkYik, and a substitution 
into the definition of the inequality measure (3) yields 
 
     I(Y)= ΣkΣiai(Y)Yi =ΣkSk ,    (5) 
 
after reordering. This equation defines a decomposition given the weights. 
Often-used inequality measures can be written as (4) but not uniquely.  The 
Gini coefficient is an example, which can be written in alternative forms, 
yet in accordance with (4) but with differences in the ai(Y)-weights. 
 One resolution to this indeterminacy is to use a ‘natural’ decomposition 
rule following from the usual way an index is written. This is less 
satisfactory and an alternative is to impose restrictions, at least if those are 
reasonable. Shorrocks considers two additional restrictions to basic 
conditions given in a while. The first additional restriction requires that an 
income source makes no contribution to overall inequality if income 
receipts from this source are equally distributed. The second assumes that if 
total income is divided into two components whose factor distributions are 
permutations of each other, then these two components contribute equally 
to aggregate inequality. These extra restrictions determine a unique 
decomposition rule given by 
 
   R Sk = cov(Yk,Y)/var(Y),   (6) 
 
for income component k, writing the contribution of this component as a 
proportion of total variance. The rule (6) is independent of any inequality 
measure and incidentally is a natural decomposition rule for the squared 
coefficient of variation and for the variance.   
Compared to the decomposition of the squared coefficient of variance 
for a total CVT
2 into the squared coefficients of variance for the 
components (3) a decomposition according to (6) is simpler and fulfils the 
following desirable basic properties:  
-symmetry (different income components are treated symmetrically and 
the contribution of the k
th component should not be affected by the way 
components are numbered or named)  
-independence (there is no dependence of how many other types of 
income are distinguished)  
-consistency (the sum of contributions equals the value of the inequality 
index).   11
The condition of consistency is clearly not valid for (3), in the sense that 
the sum of the weighted squared coefficients of variance is not equal to the 
squared coefficient for the total.  
However, Shorrocks’ first additional restriction that an income source 
makes no contribution to overall inequality if income receipts from this 
source are equally distributed, implying that identical lump sum transfers 
not are an equalising force is questionable, as is recognised already by 
Shorrocks. This has prompted Paul (2004) to replace the additional 
restrictions above by two other conditions. These are:  
-proportionality (if income component k is a constant proportion of total 
income then its inequality contribution should be in the same proportion) 
and  
-negativity (the contribution of an income source should be negative if 
all the individuals receive identical positive income from that source). 
These conditions are fulfilled by natural decomposition of members of the 
class of generalised entropy indices, specifically for Theil’s T1 written as 
(4) with ai(Y)=ln(Yi/µ) / (Nµ), where µ=ΣiYi/N. The negativity condition is 
not fulfilled for the squared coefficient or variance or half of this 
coefficient written with as (4) with ai(Y)= (Yi-µ) / (2Nµ
2)  and also a 
generalised entropy index, nor is the condition valid for the Gini coefficient 
written as (4) with ai(Y)=(2/(N
2µ)(i-(N+1)/2), corresponding to a frequent 
way of writing the Gini coefficient. As a consequence some results for 
Theil’s T1 will be provided, as a complement to the coefficient of variance 





Let us first regard the inequality effects of the benefits generally, by 
comparing Lorenz curves for money wage and wage expanded with the 
different benefits. A Lorenz curve shows the cumulative proportion of 
income received by the individuals in a cumulated proportion of the 
population when the individuals are ordered by income. If all incomes are 
equally distributed, the Lorenz curve coincides with the 45° line. Inequality 
shows up in a curve below the diagonal 45° line.  
In Figure 1a, Lorenz curves for money wage and total wage are shown. 
The money wage curve dominates, i.e. is above, the total wage curve 
indicating a larger inequality for the expanded variable. The curves do not 
intersect and it appears that total wage is more unevenly distributed at all 
points. From Figure 1b, we see a similar difference between money wage   12
and money wage with pension benefits added: the increase in inequality 
seems to emanate from the pension benefits. This is confirmed by the 
corresponding Lorenz curves when sickness benefits (Figure 1c) and 
survivor’s benefits (Figure 1d) are added to money wage, respectively. 
These curves are virtually indistinguishable from the curve for money 
wage. Whether the 29 individuals with negative total income are included 
or not makes little or no change in the Lorenz curves, except at the very left 
end for total income. 
Figures 2 and 3 show quantile curves for money wage and money wage 
with either pension benefits, sickness benefits or survivor’s benefits added. 
In these diagrams we can see how the benefits change the quantiles over 
the quantile scales. The pension benefits make higher quantiles differ more 
than lower quantiles while the sickness benefits have a more uniform 
effect. Note that the ordering between the individuals differ for the curves 
as it does for the Lorenz curves for different wage measures, this is the 
explanation for the curve for money wage with pension benefits being 
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Figure 2: Quantile curves for money wage and the different 
extended wage measures. 
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Figure 3: Quantile curves  for money wage and the different 






Coefficients of variation squared (CV
2) are shown in Tables 2 to 5. We see 
that the coefficients are much larger for the benefits than for money wage 
resulting in a value for total wage double the value for money wage for all 
according to the first row in Table 2. The share of the benefits to total wage 
is 22 percent and the money wage-benefits correlation is about 0.5, which 
is sizable. The benefits contribute a bit more to inequality than does money 
wage, .53 in the last column as compared to the complement 1-.53 or .47. 
These inequality contributions are calculated according to (6). Within the 
socio-economic groups the effects of the benefits are relatively small for 
blue-collar workers and municipal white-collars, while the effects are 
relatively high for private white-collars. The share of the benefits to total 
wage is also higher for the latter group. Part of the differences between the 
groups may be due to differences in working hours and the frequency of 
part-time work. Closer to results comparing wages are those in Table 3 
where fulltime full year workers are described.  The restriction decreases 
CV
2-values for money wage and total benefits with a notable exception for 
women’s benefits. CV
2-values for total wage is about the same as before 
except for blue-collar workers where the inequality is lower. The effect for 
the relative contribution is an increase for the benefits for blue-collar 
workers.  
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Table 2.  Decomposition of the squared coefficient of variation 

























all  10954 0.26 4.13 0.52  0.22  0.49  0.53 
men  5425 0.26 4.65 0.55  0.21  0.50  0.54 
women  5529 0.16 2.94 0.36  0.22  0.48  0.57 
whitecollars            
 private  3562 0.35  5.11  0.77 0.26  0.47  0.60 
 state  755 0.16  1.20  0.28 0.23  0.78  0.45 
  municipal  1986 0.18 0.42 0.19  0.20  0.70  0.24 
blue collars            
 private  2906 0.10  0.80  0.12 0.17  0.43  0.32 
 state  187 0.10  0.55  0.11 0.18  0.40  0.29 





Table 3: Decomposition of the squared coefficient of variation 
for total wage by source for men, women and different groups. 

























all 7000  0.23  4.18  0.51 0.22  0.49  0.57 
men 4454  0.25  4.37  0.54 0.22  0.50  0.56 
women 2546  0.14  3.52  0.37 0.23 0.46  0.64 
whitecollars              
 private  2676  0.32  4.97  0.75 0.26 0.46  0.61 
 state  569  0.14  1.21  0.27 0.23 0.82  0.47 
 municipal  1223  0.16  0.34  0.16 0.20  0.68  0.23 
blue collars              
 private  1892  0.05  0.69  0.07 0.17 0.39  0.41 
 state  110  0.03  0.32  0.04 0.18 0.37  0.36 
 municipal  530  0.04  0.28  0.06 0.20  0.48  0.36 
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Results for decomposition of the benefits are shown in Tables 4 and 5. 
Reading those tables it should be kept in mind that different estimation 
principles are used for the different benefits. While pension and survivors’ 
benefits are estimated individually, sickness benefits are estimated group-
wise, resulting in the same sickness benefit to all individuals within the 
same socio-economic, sector, sex and age group. The inequality for 
sickness benefits is similar to the inequality for money wage but probably 
is understated. The coefficient of variation squared is large as regard 
pension benefits considering the large groups all, men and women. Private 
white-collars are likewise unequal. The share of pension benefits is much 
larger than the shares for the other benefits, with the survivor’s benefits 
only amounting to 1 percent. The relative contribution of pension benefits 
to total wage inequality is large also compared to the contribution of money 
wage with exception for blue-collars and municipal white-collars. 
In Table 5 benefits are decomposed by source; that is whether the 
insurance is provided by the state or through bargaining agreements. We 
see much larger inequality for the negotiated benefits as compared to the 
social benefits. The shares of social benefits are larger than the shares of 
negotiated benefits except for private white-collars. On the other hand 
inequality contributions are larger for negotiated benefits except for blue-
collars and municipal white-collars. The CV
2-comparisons are also affected 
by the different principles of estimation and differences should be 
interpreted with care remembering that the sickness insurance is mainly 
public. 
The results so far are that inequality increases when compensation is 
considered instead of money income. The increase is relatively large for 
white-collar workers, except municipal white-collars, but relatively small 
for blue-collar workers. Pensions benefits seem more important for this 
result than sickness benefits and survivors’ benefits; likewise negotiated 
benefits seem more important than social benefits.    18
Table 4 Decomposition of the squared coefficient of variation for total wage by  
money wage and different benefits for men, women and different groups
3    
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All 10954 0.26  0.24 6.80 1.40 0.52 0.04 0.17 0.01 0.47 0.01 0.52 0.01
men 5425 0.26  0.32 7.09 1.44 0.55 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.46 0.01 0.53 0.01
women 5529 0.16  0.17 5.39 0.98 0.36 0.05 0.16 0.01 0.43 0.02 0.54 0.00
white 
collars                    
 private  3562 0.35  0.42 6.51 1.23 0.77 0.02 0.23 0.01 0.40 0.01 0.58 0.00
 state  755 0.16  0.26 1.56 1.48 0.28 0.03 0.19 0.01 0.55 0.02 0.42 0.02
 municipal 1986 0.18  0.19 0.61 1.03 0.19 0.04 0.14 0.01 0.76 0.03 0.20 0.01
blue 
collars                    
 private  2906 0.10  0.13 1.88 1.38 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.01 0.68 0.04 0.27 0.01
 state  187 0.10  0.12 1.06 1.15 0.11 0.05 0.12 0.01 0.72 0.04 0.23 0.02





                                                 




Table 5: Decomposition of the squared coefficient of variation for 
total wage by negotiated and social benefits for men, women and 
different groups
4  
   CV























All  10954  0.26 28.74 0.45 0.52 0.08 0.14 0.47 0.47 0.06 
men  5425  0.26 19.90 0.41 0.55 0.10 0.11 0.46 0.50 0.04 
women  5529  0.16 50.42 0.48 0.36 0.05 0.17 0.43 0.44 0.12 
white collars               
  private  3562  0.35 14.91 0.49 0.77 0.15 0.11 0.40 0.56 0.04 
 state  755  0.16  4.52  0.44  0.28 0.10 0.13 0.55 0.37 0.08 
 municipal  1986  0.18  6.70  0.38  0.19 0.03 0.17 0.76 0.09 0.15 
blue collars               
  private  2906  0.10 21.34 0.43 0.12 0.02 0.15 0.68 0.13 0.19 
 state  187  0.10  3.99  0.46  0.11 0.04 0.14 0.72 0.09 0.20 




That money income contributes more to total income inequality than the benefits 
for blue-collars while the opposite holds for private white-collars according to 
the decompositions fits the picture.  Let us however also consider results for 
Theil’s T1, a measure which has the property of negativity according to section 
4, that is here an identical lump sum transfer to all is an equalising component in 
a decomposition. Theil’s T1 is not defined for negative income, so let us first 
consider results for CV
2 ignoring the 29 observations with negative total 
income. Then CV
2 decreases from .26 to .25 for all while the contribution to 
inequality for total income from money income increases from .47 to .49. 
Theil’s T1 for all is .16 with a contribution of money income amounting to .37, 
that is here money income is less important than for the coefficient of variation. 
For private white-collars the money income contribution decreases from .43 to 
.25, that is considerable more than for private blue-collars where the decrease is 
from .68 for CV
2 to .59 for Theil’s T1.  Both measures belong to the class of 
single parameter generalised entropy measures with parameter 1 (Theil’s T1) 
and 2 for CV
2/2. The more positive the parameter is the more sensitive the 
measure is to income differences at the top, therefore is reasonable that the 
differences between the CV
2/2 –values for private blue-collars of .06 and for 
private white-collars of .35 are larger than the corresponding differences for 
Theil’s T1 where the values are .06 and .23 respectively.  For both groups 
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however, the relative importance of the benefits is smaller according to CV
2/2 





Using standard methods of income inequality measurement we find that 
insurance benefits increase annual income inequality (relative to inequality 
observed in the distribution of wage income) by 100 percent for CV
2, or 
equivalently by 40 percent for the coefficient of variation, CV. The share of the 
benefits to total wage is 22 percent and the correlation between money wage and 
benefits is about 0.5. The increase in inequality emanates from the pension 
benefits. The effects of sickness benefits and survivors’ benefits are small. The 
effect of the benefits is minor for blue-collar workers and for municipal white-
collars, while the effects are high for private white-collars. According to 
decomposition of inequality by income source, the importance of the benefits is 
larger than their share. Compared to results for the U.S. and for pension benefits, 
according to Benedict and Shaw (1995), the share of the benefits are about 7-8 
times larger here, the correlations between benefits and income are larger, as 
well as the impact of benefits on compensation inequality. 
Wage regressions are an alternative way to display the effects of the incidence 
of benefits. In Granqvist, Selén and Ståhlberg (2002) it is examined whether an 
extended wage measure for the traditional earnings equation affects the gender gap 
or the returns on human capital using the same data set as in this study. The results 
demonstrate that the returns to human capital investments are underestimated 
when benefit income is omitted.  
To sum up, the results indicate that money wage only is a too narrow measure 









Benedict, Mary Ellen and Kathryn Shaw (1995), The Impact of Pension Benefits 
on the Distribution of Earned Income, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 
48, 740-757.¨ 
Bloom, David E. and Richard B. Freeman (1992), The Fall in Private Pension 




Foster, James E. and Efe A. Ok (1999), Lorenz dominance and the variance of 
logarithms, Econometrica, 67, 901-907.  
Granqvist, Lena, Selén, Jan and Ann-Charlotte Ståhlberg (2002), Mandatory 
Earnings-Related Insurance Rights, Human Capital and the Gender Earnings 
Gap in Sweden, FIEF Working Paper Series 2002, No. 179. 
Katz, Lawrence F. and David H. Autor (1999), Changes in the wage structure 
and earnings equality, in Orley C. Ashenfelter, and David Card (eds.), 
Handbook of Labor Economics, vol 3A, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1463-
1548. 
Lazear, Edward and Sherwin Rosen (1987), Pension Inequality, in Zvi Bodie, 
John Shoven and David Wise (eds.), Issues in Pension Economics, University 
of Chicago Press, 341-363. 
Paul, Satya (2004), Income sources effects on inequality, Journal of 
Development Economics, 73, 435-451. 
Selén, Jan and Ann-Charlotte Ståhlberg (2002), The importance of sickness 
benefit rights for a comparison of wages, Working paper 1/2002, Swedish 
Institute for Social Research, Stockholm. 
Shorrocks, Anthony. F. (1982), Inequality decomposition by factor components, 
Econometrica, 50, 193-210. 
Shorrocks Anthony. F. (1983), The impact of income components on the 
distribution of family incomes,  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 311-331. 
Vågerö, Denny and Olle Lundberg (1995), Socioeconomic Mortality 
Differentials among Adults in Sweden, in A. Lopez, G. Caselli and T. 
Valkonen (eds.), Adult Mortality in Developed Countries: From Description 
to Explanation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 222-242. Working Paper Series/Arbetsrapport 
 
FIEF Working Paper Series was initiated in 1985. A complete list is available from FIEF upon request. 




166. Hansson, Pär, “Skill Upgrading and Production Transfer within Swedish Multinationals 
in the 1990s”, 27 pp. 
 
167. Arai, Mahmood and Skogman Thoursie, Peter, “Incentives and Selection in Cyclical 
Absenteeism”, 15 pp. 
 
168.  Hansen, Sten and Persson, Joakim, “Direkta undanträngningseffekter av 
arbetsmarknadspolitiska åtgärder”, 27 pp. 
 
169. Arai, Mahmood and Vilhelmsson, Roger, ”Immigrants’ and Natives’ Unemployment-
risk: Productivity Differentials or Discrimination?”, 27 pp. 
 
170.  Johansson, Sten och  Selén, Jan, ”Arbetslöshetsförsäkringen och arbetslösheten (2). 
Reformeffekt vid 1993 års sänkning av ersättningsgraden i arbetslöshetsförsäkringen?”, 39 
pp. 
 
171. Johansson, Sten, ”Conceptualizing and Measuring Quality of Life for National Policy”, 
18 pp. 
 
172. Arai, Mahmood and Heyman, Fredrik, “Wages, Profits and Individual Unemployment 
Risk: Evidence from Matched Worker-Firm Data”, 27 pp. 
 
173. Lundborg, Per and Sacklén, Hans, “Is There a Long Run Unemployment- Inflation 
Trade-off in Sweden?”, 29 pp. 
 
174. Alexius, Annika and Carlsson, Mikael, “Measures of Technology and the Business 
Cycle: Evidence from Sweden and the U.S.”, 47 pp. 
 





176. Gustavsson, Patrik, “The Dynamics of European Industrial Structure”, 41 pp. 
 
177. Selén, Jan, “Taxable Income Responses to Tax Changes – A Panel Analysis of the 
1990/91 Swedish Reform”, 30 pp. 
 
178. Eriksson, Clas and Persson, Joakim, “Economic Growth, Inequality, Democratization, 
and the Environment”, 21 pp. 
 
179. Granqvist, Lena, Selén, Jan and Ståhlberg, Ann-Charlotte, “Mandatory Earnings-
Related Insurance Rights, Human Capital and the Gender Earnings Gap in Sweden”, 21 pp.  
180. Larsson, Anna, “The Swedish Real Exchange Rate under Different Currency Regimes”, 
22 pp. 
 
181. Heyman, Fredrik, “Wage Dispersion and Job Turnover: Evidence from Sweden”, 28 
pp. 
 
182.  Nekby, Lena, “Gender Differences in Recent Sharing and its Implications for the 
Gender Wage Gap”, 22 pp. 
 
183. Johansson, Sten and Selén, Jan, “Coping with Heterogeneities in the Difference in 
Differences Design”, 13 pp.   
 
184. Pekkarinen, Tuomas and Vartiainen, Juhana, “Gender Differences in Job Assignment 
and Promotion in a Complexity Ladder of Jobs”, 27 pp. 
 
185.  Nekby, Lena, “How Long Does it Take to Integrate? Employment Convergence of 
Immigrants and Natives in Sweden”, 33 pp. 
 
186.  Heyman, Fredrik, “Pay Inequality and Firm Performance: Evidence from Matched 
Employer-Employee Data”, 38 pp. 
 
187. Lundborg, Per and Rechea, Calin, “Will Transition Countries Benefit or Lose from the 





188.  Lundborg, Per and Sacklén, Hans, “Low-Inflation Targeting and Unemployment 
Persistence”, 34 pp. 
 
189.  Hansson, Pär and Lundin,Nan Nan, “Exports as an Indicator on or Promoter of 
Successful Swedish Manufacturing Firms in the 1990s”, 39 pp.  
 
190.  Gustavsson, Patrik and Poldahl, Andreas, “Determinants of Firm R&D: Evidence 
from Swedish Firm Level Data”, 22 pp. 
 
191.  Larsson, Anna and Zetterberg, Johnny, “Does Inflation Targeting Matter for Labour 
Markets? Some Empirical Evidence”,  38 pp. 
 
192.  Lundin, Nan Nan, “Has Import Disciplined Swedish Manufacturing Firms in the 
1990s?”, 28 pp. 
 
 
004   
 
193.  Heyman, Fredrik, “The Employer Age-Wage Effect: Evidence from Matched 
Employer-Employee Data”, 31 pp.   
 194.  Karpaty, Patrik and Lars Lundberg, “Foreign Direct Investment and Productivity 
Spillovers in Swedish Manufacturing”, 28 pp.  
 
195.  Lundin, Nannan, " Import Competition, Product Differentiation and Mark-Ups - 
Microeconomic Evidence from Swedish Manufacturing in the 1990s", 33 pp. 
 
196.  Lundin,  Nannan and Lihong Yun, "International Trade and Inter-Industry Wage 
Structure in Swedish Manufacturing - Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data", 25 
pp.  
 
197.  Selén, Jan and Ann-Charlotte Ståhlberg, “Wage and Compensation Inequality – Hoe 
Different?”,  21 pp. 
 
 